Introduction

1.
In our description of the private healthcare industry we referred to the consumer 'pathway' to both private health cover and private healthcare. At various points on this pathway the consumer has to make choices: which private medical insurance product to buy, which consultant to see, which treatment recommendation to follow and at which hospital or clinic to be treated. If the consumer lacks the necessary information on which to base these choices, or if information asymmetries exist, it is possible that distortions may arise.
2.
As the OFT pointed out in its Market Study, accessible, standardized and comparable information is vital for ensuring that consumers can exercise informed choice so that markets work well. Information asymmetries, where suppliers have better information about the quality and price of a product than consumers, can dampen competition between suppliers and result in poor outcomes for consumers in terms of price, quality, innovation and productivity. 3.
In our annotated issues statement we posited (Theory of Harm 6) that the private healthcare market was characterized by both lack of information and information asymmetries. In addition, we said that we would be concerned if we identified financial or other incentives designed to capitalize or exploit any asymmetry, for example by private hospital providers offering incentives to consultants to perform additional tests or procedures at their facilities. (We discuss elsewhere schemes adopted by private hospitals to encourage consultants to use their facilities. 
4.
We now set out our current thinking on Theory of Harm 6 on the basis of the responses that we have received to our annotated issues statement and of further research and analysis that we have undertaken.
)
5.
We consider consumer information availability in the following contexts:
(a) choosing a private medical insurance policy;
(b) choosing a treatment option;
(c) choosing a consultant; and (d) choosing a private hospital.
Choosing a private medical insurance policy
Overview
6.
Private medical insurance is a product which is usually purchased with little or no knowledge of what medical condition or treatment it will be needed to cover. There is also likely to be quite a long interval between the purchase decision and usage of the policy. Consumers may, therefore, not fully appreciate at the point of choosing what features or benefits of the schemes they are considering are likely to be most important at the point of actually claiming.
7.
We have tried to assess here whether information available to consumers from private medical insurers (PMIs) at the time of purchase is adequate to enable them to understand the coverage and benefits of the product or whether, at the time of claim, misapprehensions may be revealed. We set out below submissions that have been made to us and information that we have collected, including on consumer satisfaction with and complaints regarding private medical insurance products.
What we were told
8.
In its Market Study, the OFT said that as a result of concerns expressed by consumers over payments sought by some medical practitioners when these are not wholly reimbursed by PMIs (ie 'shortfalls') it had raised the issue with the then regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 3 It reported that the FSA had told it that it intended to work with the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and individual
PMIs to ensure that insurers made clear the possibility of shortfalling to consumers though noted that this was already a requirement under FSA rules. 4 9. We contacted the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the successor body to the FSA, which told us that while it would keep the matter under review, it did not currently feel that any changes to the rules for PMIs were necessary or appropriate.
10.
Like the OFT, we also received submissions from individual consumers.
Approximately 60 members of the public wrote to us expressing a variety of concerns.
Members of the public
11.
A very common concern expressed by members of the public who contacted us was that their PMI had reduced its fee maxima for certain procedures such that the patient's consultant of choice could only be used if the patient made up the shortfall and that it had done so without informing them of, what they characterized as, a 3 OFT Market Study, paragraph 9.4. 4 The FSA rules it referred to were the Insurance Conduct of Business sourcebook (ICOBs).
reduction in coverage or benefits. 5 Bupa was more likely to be mentioned in this context than other PMIs. 6 12.
One member of the public told us that:
We provide below, by way of example, extracts from some of the letters expressing these concerns.
In July 2012 Bupa reduced the fee they paid consultants for cataract surgery from £741 to £289. Bupa did not write to advise us of any such changes .... As a result of Bupa's actions we were required to pay over £900 to the consultant. This would not have been the case had those operations taken place prior to July 2012. 
13.
A second member of the public made exactly the same complaint regarding a cataract operation ie that they returned to the same surgeon for a second cataract operation but between the first and the second the Bupa maximum had been reduced and, consequently, they were faced with either seeing what they described as 'a less experienced...surgeon' or making up the shortfall, in this case of just under £600. restrictions exist when they come to make a claim.' An AXA PPP personal subscriber 5 In some cases where it was alleged that the PMI had altered the terms of the policy unilaterally it was evident that the correspondent was part of a corporate scheme, not an individual member. We have assumed that, in fact, these changes would have been agreed between the PMI and the employer, who may have perhaps failed to communicate this to employees. 6 In June 2010 Bupa introduced its new consultant contract which required consultants wishing to be recognized by Bupa to charge within its fee maxima. Although this made it less likely that a consumer would be faced with a shortfall, it may also have led to certain consultants no longer being available to Bupa subscribers because they did not consent to Bupa's terms. (See Bupa response to the issues statement, p104.) 7 Member of the public 11. 8 Member of the public 36.
said that 'AXA does not make fee-capping absolutely clear in its literature and omits to mention it when phoning to check that you are renewing.' 9 15. Shortfall concerns did not arise solely over surgeons. Two member of the public told us that their PMI had shortfalled them over anaesthetists fees. One said she underwent urgent surgery and that whereas Bupa paid her surgeon's fees in full she had to make up the shortfall to the anaesthetist's fee and that, upon querying this, was told that Bupa could not provide a recognized anaesthetist at this particular hospital. The correspondent attributed this situation to the position of the local Anaesthetist Group. 10 Another told us that Bupa's fee maximum for anaesthetists in the procedure concerned was £325 whereas the estimate for services provided by the York Anaesthetists Group was £385 and that Bupa was unable to provide an anaesthetist in that area who worked within its fee maximum.
11
16. It was very rare for consumers to complain that their PMI had directed them to an inappropriate consultant (say a hip specialist for an elbow condition) though some consultant bodies had criticized PMIs on this score. 12 However, a few told us that they thought that consultants put forward as alternatives by their PMI were less appropriate or less experienced than their consultant of choice. One member of the public told us that the consultant that he had previously seen regarding an ear complaint had ceased to be authorized by Bupa which had suggested that the patient see another consultant who, he said, whilst having some experience of ears specialized in head and neck conditions. 
17.
We also received a few expressions of concern that some private medical insurance policies prevented consumers from using their hospital of choice, though it appeared that in these cases the consumer was part of a corporate scheme which gave members access to a restricted list of hospitals. We assumed that in these cases the employer would have been aware of and had agreed to this arrangement but that this had not been communicated to the member, who in some cases had retired from the firm. 
18
21.
The ABI told us that PMIs were required by regulation to set out in clear terms the nature of the cover that was in their policies during the sales process and that any insurer that failed to comply with these requirements would face regulatory action. It said that the number of complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)
regarding PMIs was low and that so was the rate of complaints upheld. 
Survey evidence and complaints
Our survey evidence
25.
Though not a major focus of our consumer survey, we did ask some questions that were relevant to the experience of customers claiming under private medical insurance policies. 21 We asked whether those making a claim had had it met in its entirety by the PMI. 64 per cent of respondents said that they had. The majority of respondents who said that their PMI had not met the costs of their treatment fully said that this was the result of a policy excess.
22
18 PPF initial submission. 19 British Association of Dermatologists response to the issues statement. 20 AAGBI response to the annotated issues statement. 21 www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/2012/private-healthcare-market-investigation/ survey_patients_report.pptx. 22 A policy excess is the amount that a policyholder agrees, at the time of taking out the insurance policy, to pay towards the cost of a claim.
26. 5 per cent of patients said that they chose a consultant who was not fully covered by their insurance, resulting in them having to pay for some or all of their treatment.
Nearly all of these respondents said that they had been made aware of monetary restrictions in their policy regarding consultants' fees but it was not clear from their responses whether this was at the time of purchase or at the beginning of the claims process.
Complaints
27.
We looked at the number of complaints received by the FOS concerning private medical insurance providers as a potential indicator of information asymmetry. The overall impression we have formed is that private medical insurance policy terms have been sufficiently transparent to consumers at the point of purchase that they have not reported, through surveys, dissatisfaction or disappointment at the point of claim.
29
Aviva has attributed recent increases in the number of disputes being taken by Aviva customers to the FOS to the growth of its PMI business as well as high profile media coverage of PPI driving wider complaint activity across protection products. See Shock rise in complaints to FOS about medical insurance, Health Insurance, 11 April 2013. www.hi-mag.com/health-insurance/product-area/pmi/article420777.ece.
35.
While around 60 individuals contacted us to express concerns based on their own experience, we place greater weight on our own survey data and, for example that provided by Which?, which showed relatively high satisfaction levels amongst those making claims, as we think survey data is more likely to be representative of consumers' experience with PMIs.
36.
We 
Choosing a treatment option
Overview
37.
Patients are very unlikely to be as medically well informed as their consultants and will thus have to rely on them for expert and impartial advice. If that consultant is participating in a scheme which offers him or her incentives to, for example, admit patients to a particular hospital or to refer them for certain tests, even if patients are aware of this they may be uncertain whether the consultant has taken account of this in making a recommendation. In these circumstances there will be asymmetry of information between the patient (the principal) and the consultant (his or her agent) which may give rise to distortions.
38.
In this section we examine what information is available to patients to enable them to evaluate consultant recommendations regarding treatment options and if this is sufficient to address concerns regarding information asymmetry in this particular context. 
Variations in patient treatment
Map of medicine for shoulder pain
Source: NHS Choices.
48.
As can be seen, the 'map' indicates conservative management (physiotherapy)
initially though provides for early referral if this is considered appropriate by the clinician. 
Patient decision aids
54.
We think that it would be extremely difficult to quantify the extent of over-treatment in private medicine since, for example, it is difficult to find an appropriate benchmark.
Certain procedures might rarely be performed under general anaesthetic within the NHS on cost grounds, for example, even if patients would prefer this. It might therefore be unreasonable to characterise the use, in private medicine, of general anaesthesia as 'over-treatment.' One reason consumers take out private health insurance is to avail themselves of options not generally available on the NHS.
55.
Even if it could be shown that unwarranted over-treatment was commonplace, on the basis of this, albeit limited, review we think that lack of consumer information or information asymmetry regarding treatment options would be unlikely to be its cause.
We think that there is a great deal of information available to consumers about the treatment options available to them for many common conditions. Further, we think that this is likely to increase over time since the NHS is aiming to save money and making patients aware of (cheaper) treatment options is aligned with this goal.
Choosing a consultant
56.
We start by distinguishing between two types of information concerning consultants: 
Professional information
What the parties told us 57 . Bupa said that it had significant concerns that consultants (and hospitals) in private practice had failed to produce data that allowed patients, GPs and insurers to evaluate and compare the quality of the treatments they performed and the care they offered, as well as the cost. It said that this gap in information put patients at risk and also created the perverse outcome that patients sometimes incorrectly assumed that price was a sign of quality. It told us that greater transparency of information was fundamental to empowering patients (and the commissioners of care on their behalf). 43 58. Bupa provided us with the results of a survey that it had conducted among GPs. This indicated that GPs would like more information about consultant performance and clinical outcomes, with half of those responding saying that they either relied on intuition when making a referral or asked a colleague for a recommendation.
FIGURE 2
Bupa GP survey findings Strongly/slightly agree combined Neither agree nor disagree Slightly/strongly disagree combined Don't know 59. Aviva too said that there was clear asymmetry between the patient and the provider as regards the appropriateness, quality and price of various treatment options that may be available to the patient. It said that this asymmetry restricted the patient's (as well as the GP and the PMI's) ability to make an informed choice about the most appropriate hospital/consultant. It said that while it recognized that healthcare information was often complex it was possible to provide information that patients could use and would find useful. It cited, for example, outcome and process measures relating to treatment conducted. 45 60.
Aviva noted the importance of the GP in the early referral process and that the majority of patients followed the GP's recommendation. However, it said that it was concerned that GPs were not well informed about the quality of consultants. A survey of GPs which it had conducted indicated that that more GPs recommended a consultant on the basis of his or her reputation (77 per cent) than on the basis of their quality (7 per cent). It said that the surveys undertaken by the OFT indicated that patients and GPs were not as concerned by a lack of information as the CC had suggested.
45 Aviva response to the annotated issues statement, section 2.6. 46 Aviva response to the issues statement, 5.7.3. 47 www.phin.org.uk/About.aspx.
information and did not think it was necessary for the GP to provide this level of 
Financial information
65.
We now turn to arrangements between consultants and hospitals which may encourage consultants to use that hospital's facilities. We described in our working paper on hospital competition 50 66. We also set out the requirements of the General Medical Council (GMC) which restrict clinicians' ability to seek or accept certain payments or gifts or other the nature and extent of these schemes and noted that private hospital operators had been reshaping them, coincident with the regulatory intervention by the OFT and the coming into force of the Bribery Act 2010.
48 Ramsay response to the annotated issues statement, p29.
inducements and which require that, if a conflict of interest does arise, then the consultant declares this to the patient. 68. Hospitals, in their submissions on this issue, tended to argue that in some parts of the country, London in particular, the practice had become widespread since it was necessary to offer incentives to attract key consultants and that competition for consultants was intense.
53
Our research
However, some said that they would welcome clarification from the CC on the merits and de-merits of various types of scheme.
69.
Our working paper on hospital competition for clinical referrals 54 51 revealed that the practice of offering consultants incentives to treat patients or refer them for tests at particular hospitals had been widespread, though since 2011 schemes had become more sophisticated and more liable to stress the clinicians' obligations to comply with GMC guidelines regarding the best interests of their patients.
www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice.asp. 52 AXA PPP response to the annotated issues statement, paragraph 1.3. 53 See, for example, General Healthcare Group's response to the issues statement, paragraph 2.3 b.
70.
Our survey of clinicians, however, did not indicate that consultants were aware of the practice. Over 80 per cent of consultants said that hospitals either did not offer incentives to encourage them to use their facilities or equipment or that they did not know whether they did. 11 per cent said that hospitals did offer incentives. Only 3 per cent of consultants said they personally had been offered any type of incentive or benefit (such as reduced room fees, secretarial support etc) in the past five years.
One possible explanation for this, apparent, under-claiming is that the practices referred to may be considered by clinicians to reflect badly on the profession.
Another could be that, in the case of consultants who had accepted an incentive or benefit was bound by a non-disclosure agreement.
71.
The GMC rules not only prevent clinicians from accepting inducements: they also require that where a conflict of interest does arise it must be declared. 55 We did not undertake a systematic review of consultant or practice websites to determine the extent to which consultants who are involved in, for example, joint ventures with hospital groups or who own an equity stake in a hospital or clinic, disclose this.
However, the impression that we formed during this investigation, from reviewing consultants' and practices websites was that, generally, they did not do so on their websites 56
Preliminary conclusion-choosing a consultant though they may, of course, disclose this at their consulting rooms by means of a notice, for example, or tell patients in the course of their consultation. 80.
Professional information
The submissions of hospital groups on performance data were not extensive.
Ramsay, however, said that it believed that the PHIN project would, in the very near Aviva set out additional information that it would like to see published and explained the use that it would make of it. The information it would wish to see available included safety data (for example, the percentage of admissions with MRSA) access information (whether the patient was given a choice of dates) and information on the patient experience.
future, deliver information on private hospitals equivalent to if not more comprehensive than that available on NHS hospitals. 68 Ramsay response to the annotated issues statement, paragraph 10.9. 69 Including BMI, HCA, Spire, Ramsay, Aspen and Circle.
Preliminary conclusion-choosing a hospital The report concludes that there is a clear gap in the provision of clearly presented, comprehensive and trusted information on the quality of care providers which might properly inform the public and users about the quality of care and recommends that the concept is pursued further, including a consideration of the costs and benefits entailed.
